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Abstract. In light of a recent reformulation of Bell’s theorem from causal principles by Howard
Wiseman and the author, I argue that the conflict between quantum theory and relativity
brought up by Bell’s work can be softened by a revision of our classical notions of causation.
I review some recent proposals for a quantum theory of causation that make great strides
towards that end, but highlight a property that is shared by all those theories that would not
have satisfied Bell’s realist inclinations. They require (implicitly or explicitly) agent-centric
notions such as “controllables” and “uncontrollables”, or “observed” and “unobserved”. Thus
they relieve the tensions around Bell’s theorem by highlighting an issue more often associated
with another deep conceptual issue in quantum theory: the measurement problem. Rather than
rejecting those terms, however, I argue that we should understand why they seem to be, at least
at face-value, needed in order to reach compatibility between quantum theory and relativity.
This seems to suggest that causation, and thus causal structure, are emergent phenomena, and
lends support to the idea that a resolution of the conflict between quantum theory and relativity
necessitates a solution to the measurement problem.
1. Introduction
“For me then this is the real problem with quantum theory: the apparently essential
conflict between any sharp formulation [of quantum theory] and fundamental relativity.
That is to say, we have an apparent incompatibility, at the deepest level, between the
two fundamental pillars of contemporary theory (...) It may be that a real synthesis
of quantum and relativity theories requires not just technical developments but radical
conceptual renewal.”- J.S. Bell, 1986 [1]
Bell’s famous 1964 theorem [2] has challenged our understanding of quantum theory and
ignited much debate on its foundations as well as technological spin-offs such as device-
independent quantum cryptography and randomness amplification. More than 50 years later,
the debate still hasn’t settled. As the quote above shows, Bell saw his work as demonstrating a
fundamental incompatibility between quantum theory and relativity, and believed that a solution
would require a “radical conceptual renewal”. Here we take the point of view that at least part of
that renewal regards our understanding of causality. In fact, Bell’s theorem is best understood as
being about the constraints from causal structure to possible correlations among events, where
relativity comes in merely to supply the causal structure.
But who cares about causality? Some philosophers, like Bertrand Russell, have argued that it
has no role in fundamental physics. In his famous 1913 essay “On the Notion of Cause”, Russell
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that “The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic
of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no
harm” [4]. For Russell, the time-asymmetric notions of cause and effect are not compatible with
the deterministic and time-symmetric laws of physics, in which the future determines the past
just as the past determines the future. Another point of view is defended by Nancy Cartwright
[5]: “Bertrand Russell argued that laws of association are all the laws there are, and that causal
principles cannot be derived from the causally symmetric laws of association. (...) Causal
principles cannot be reduced to laws of association; but they cannot be done away with”.
For Cartwright, causal principles are required to distinguish between effective and ineffective
strategies.
For Cartwright, effective action requires that agents represent their world in causal terms.
This view is shared by philosophers such as Huw Price, although he argues [6] that nevertheless
this position does not require realism about causation, that is, it doesn’t require a commitment
to causation and its associated agent-centric concepts as a fundamental aspect of the ontology.
Rather, Price defends the view that causation emerges from an agent’s perspective in the world,
while proposing that the world itself may be describable in a view from nowhere, a block universe.
Despite the influence of Russell’s causal eliminativist view in the philosophical literature, I
believe that it is a minority view within physicists. The word “causality” certainly appears in
a wide range of physics literature, often associated with the light-cone structure of relativity
theory and the impossibility of something (information, physical systems, influences...) being
transmitted between space-like separated regions. Specifically within discussions on Bell’s
theorem, the debate is usually about what notion of causality to use, rather than whether
causality plays a role in Physics. The views in this realm can be broadly classified according to
the holder’s philosophical inclination as an operationalist or a realist. Here the conflict becomes
a terminological dispute about what is the physically correct notion of locality, with different
camps disagreeing about whether or not it is violated by quantum theory. Roughly speaking,
the realist (like Bell) focuses on the importance of causal notions as the basis for the explanation
of correlations, and believes that quantum correlations violate the causal structure imposed by
relativity and is thus nonlocal. The operationalist, on the other hand, focuses on the fact that
quantum correlations cannot be used to send signals faster than light and is thus local, and
believes that it is Bell’s classical notion of local causality that is to blame for the apparent
conflict.
In a recent article [7], Howard Wiseman and the author have presented a reformulation of
Bell’s theorem in terms of causal notions, and proposed a way forward for the debate between
operationalists and realists. In that formulation, Bell’s theorem was shown to be derived from
four Axioms and four Principles the definitions of which can be agreed upon by operationalists
and realists alike, with the disagreement being merely about which of those to drop in light of
the contradiction with observed phenomena. For the realist, it is relativistic causality that must
go, to be supplemented perhaps by a preferred foliation of space-time such as that required
by Bohmian mechanics. For the operationalist, it is the notion that a cause explains the
correlation between two variables by rendering them uncorrelated. In our reformulation, this was
accomplished by following an earlier proposal by the author and Ray Lal to break Reichenbach’s
principle of common cause into two logically separate principles [8].
Reichenbach’s principle [9] is a fundamental tenet in the classical theory of causation. It states
that if two events are correlated, then either one causes the other, or there exists a common cause
such that conditioned on it, the events become uncorrelated. In [7] this principle was separated
as a principle of Common Causes, requiring that two sets of events A and B are correlated only
if one causes the other or there exists a set of common causes C that explains the correlation
(and where the term explains is left to be defined by further principles); and a principle of
Decorrelating Explanation, by which a set of causes C explains the correlation between A and B
only if those variables are left uncorrelated by conditioning on C. By dropping the requirement
of Decorrelating Explanation, the operationalist can thus keep relativistic causal structure.
But Reichenbach’s principle is at the basis of the application of causal reasoning in the
sciences. It is for example, a consequence of the basic assumptions behind the theory of causal
networks (see e.g. the book of Pearl [10]). That theory has a wide range of applicability, and
simply dropping Reichenbach’s principle, even if only partly, would be “throwing out the baby
with the bathwater”. The challenge then becomes to generalise the classical theory of causal
networks to accommodate quantum mechanics, in a way that reduces to the classical case in some
appropriate limit. Recent work in quantum causal structures has followed that line of reasoning
and proposed generalisations of the classical theory of causal networks into a quantum theory
[11, 12, 13].
These important developments go a long way towards alleviating the “essential conflict” raised
by Bell, and at this stage the operationalist would likely be satisfied that a resolution has been
achieved. Here I will argue however, that there is still cause for concern. The reformulations so
far seem to fall short of another of Bell’s concerns, that the operationalist would do well not to
ignore. That is, they seem to require an apparent agent-centric fundamental distinction (at least
implicitly) between “controllable” and “uncontrollable” events, and indeed causal concepts are
only applicable at the level of “measurements”. This suggests that the resolution of the mystery
of Bell’s theorem so far has been a reduction to another foundational puzzle in quantum theory
– the measurement problem. This raises the question of whether this is a necessary condition
for the application of causal concepts that are compatible with quantum physics, and if so, does
it point to causal concepts having an emergent nature?
This paper is structured as follows: In Sec. 2 I review the classical theory of causal networks
and reformulate Bell’s theorem within that language. In Sec. 3 I look at recent proposals for
quantum theories of causal networks and argue that although they provide a reformulation of
the concept of causal explanation that allows for compatibility with relativistic causal structure
and reduces to the classical case in the appropriate limit, they all require agent-centric causal
concepts. I end with a discussion about how this reduces the puzzle of Bell’s theorem to the
measurement problem, and points to the possibility that causal concepts are emergent.
2. Classical causal networks
“Do we then have to fall back on “no signalling faster than light” as the expression
of the fundamental causal structure of contemporary theoretical physics? That is hard
for me to accept. For one thing we have lost the idea that correlations can be explained,
or at least this idea awaits reformulation”. J.S. Bell, “La Nouvelle Cuisine”, in [3].
What does it mean to explain correlations? Suppose a rare virus infection spreads almost
simultaneously in Australia and Brazil. Possible explanations epidemiologists would entertain
include: a) The virus was carried from Australia to Brazil; b) The virus was carried from Brazil
to Australia or c) The virus was carried to both places from a third country. This idea is
encapsulated by Reichenbach’s Principle of Common Cause (RPCC) [9]. Informally, it says that
if two events are correlated, either one is a direct cause of the other, or they share a common
cause. This principle is fundamental in many areas of science and underlies the important idea
that correlation does not necessarily imply causation.
A more modern and general theory of causation and its role in explaining correlations can be
found in the theory of causal networks [10]. It has been developed as a tool to connect causal
inferences and probabilistic observations. For example, in developing a drug, a pharmaceutical
company may want to distinguish, from some observed statistics, the effects of the drug from
correlations that do not imply causation (e.g. because a subset of the population that is more
likely to be cured without the drug is also more likely to use the drug in the first place). Here
causal structure is encoded as a graph, with nodes representing random variables of interest and
directed edges between nodes representing causal links. Since we want to exclude causal loops,
the resulting structure is that of a directed acyclic graph (DAG). An example of a DAG is given
in Fig. 1.
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Figure 1. A directed acyclic graph (DAG). Nodes represent random variables associated with possible
events and directed edges represent causal connections between events.
In a DAG G, the nodes that have arrows pointing to a given node X are denoted the parents
of X. The set of all parents of parents (of parents, etc) of X is the set of ancestors of X. The
descendants of X are all variables for which X is an ancestor.
A DAG can be seen as representing the conditional independences associated with any
probability distribution P (·) over the variables in the graph that is compatible with that causal
structure. We will use lower case letters to denote particular values of a random variable, e.g.
X = x. Formally, we say that two sets of variables X and Y are conditionally independent in
a probability distribution P (·) given a set of variables Z if and only if knowledge of Y provides
no new information about X given that we already know Z, that is P (x|y, z) = P (x|z). This is
represented as (X ⊥ Y |Z)P .
Conditional independences satisfy the graphoid axioms:
Symmetry: (X ⊥ Y |Z)P ⇐⇒ (Y ⊥ X|Z)P ;
Decomposition: (X ⊥ YW |Z)P =⇒ (X ⊥ Y |Z)P ;
Weak union: (X ⊥ YW |Z)P =⇒ (X ⊥ Y |ZW )P ;
Contraction: (X ⊥ Y |ZW )P & (X ⊥ W |Z)P =⇒ (X ⊥ YW |Z)P ;
Intersection: (X ⊥ W |ZY )P & (X ⊥ Y |ZW )P =⇒ (X ⊥ YW |Z)P
A DAG represents the conditional independences of a probability distribution in the following
way. Every probability distribution P over n variables X1, X2, ...Xn can be decomposed as a
product of conditional distributions:
P (x1, ..., xn) =
∏
j
P (xj |x1, ...xj−1) . (1)
Some of those conditional distributions will display independences, say for example
P (x3|x1, x2) = P (x3|x1). The conditional distribution for a variable Xj will depend only on a
subset of variables, the parents of Xj , denoted by PAj . A DAG G represents P , or is compatible
with P if and only if P admits a factorisation of the following form, where the parents PAj are
defined by the variables in G with directed edges terminating at Xj :
P (x1, ..., xn) =
∏
j
P (xj |paj) . (2)
In classical causal models, one obtains the conditional independencies from the graph using a
rule called d-separation. Two sets of variables X and Y are d-separated given a set of variables
Z (denoted by (X ⊥ Y |Z)d) if and only if Z “blocks” all paths (sequences of consecutive edges)
p from X to Y . A path p is said to be d-separated by Z if and only if (i) the path p contains
a chain i → m → j or a fork i ← m → j such that the middle node m is in Z, or (ii) the path
p contains an inverted fork (head-to-head) i → m ← j such that the node m is not in Z, and
there is no directed path from m to any member of Z.
The implication of d-separation for conditional independences is that if X and Y are d-
separated by Z in a DAG G, then for all distributions P that are compatible with G, X is
independent of Y given Z. That is, (X ⊥ Y |Z)d =⇒ (X ⊥ Y |Z)P for all P compatible with
G. In other words, d-separation is a sound criterion for conditional independence. Furthermore,
if for all distributions P compatible with G, (X ⊥ Y |Z)P , then (X ⊥ Y |Z)d. In other words,
d-separation is a complete criterion for conditional independence.
The conditional independencies obtained from d-separation satisfy the following property:
Causal Markov Condition: In any probability distribution P that is compatible with a
graph G, A variable X is independent of all its non-descendants, conditional on its parents.
The causal Markov Condition implies a weaker property that we call Causal Completeness:
Causal Completeness: A variable X is independent of its non-descendants, conditional on
its ancestors.
The reason for considering this weaker notion is that in theories of causal networks beyond
the classical case, it may not always be convenient to assume that the parent nodes screen off
causal influences from more distant ancestors (see e.g. [13]). With the interpretation that the
parents of a variable X are its direct causes, and the ancestors are all of its possible causes,
this principle states that an event is independent of its non-effects given its causes. Causal
Completeness implies Reichenbach’s Principle of Common Cause, with the common causal past
of two events X and Y interpreted as the intersection of their respective sets of ancestors.
2.1. Causal networks and Bell’s theorem
We are now ready to formulate Bell’s theorem in this language. Consider the usual Bell scenario,
with Alice and Bob in two space-like separated regions, performing experiments on two entangled
quantum systems. Their respective choices of experiment are given by variables X and Y, with
the associated outcomes represented by A and B. Assuming relativistic causal structure, there
cannot be any direct causal connection between events at Alice’s lab and events at Bob’s lab.
There could, however, be some common causes Λ in their common past light cone (for example,
variables associated with the preparation of the entangled quantum state). We assume that
X and Y are free variables, meaning that there are no arrows going into the causal graph
representing the situation. Given these assumptions, the scenario is represented by the graph in
Fig. 2.
The above considerations allow us to determine the set of probability distributions P that
are compatible with this graph. We can always decompose the distribution over the random
variables in question as
P (a, b, x, y, λ) = P (a|b, x, y, λ)P (b|x, y, λ)P (λ|x, y)P (x|y)P (y) . (3)
Causal Completeness implies that P (a|b, x, y, λ) = P (a|x, λ), P (b|x, y, λ) = P (b|y, λ),
P (λ|x, y) = P (λ) and P (x|y) = P (x), and so
P (a, b, x, y, λ) = P (a|x, λ)P (b|y, λ)P (λ)P (x)P (y) . (4)
A B 
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Figure 2. A directed acyclic graph (DAG) representing the causal structure of a Bell correlation
scenario, under the assumption of relativistic causality.
Averaging the conditional probabilities P (a, b, λ|x, y) = P (a, b, x, y, λ)/P (x, y) over λ we thus
obtain the usual factorisability condition of a Local Hidden Variable model:
P (a, b|x, y) =
∑
λ
P (λ)P (a|x, λ)P (b|y, λ) , (5)
and as is well known, this leads to the Bell inequalities, which are violated by certain quantum
correlations. Therefore, assuming relativistic causal structure and free choices, quantum
correlations cannot be reproduced by the classical theory of causation, which assumes Causal
Completeness.
3. Quantum causal networks
An alternative to resolve the conflict while maintaining relativistic causality is to reject
some of the principles underlying the classical theory of causal networks, including Causal
Completeness. Several recent works have proposed generalisations of the theory of causal
networks to accommodate quantum correlations [11, 12, 13]. In the following I will argue
that they raise an interesting puzzle – the apparent need for agent-centric notions such as
controllable/uncontrollable or observed/unobserved in quantum theories of causal structure.
Pienaar and Brukner (PB) [13] developed a theory based on a DAG with two different types
of nodes, corresponding to events that are controllable “settings” and those that are observable
but not directly controllable “outcomes”. Based on this they proposed a theory of quantum
causal models that satisfies a:
Quantum Causality Condition: An outcome is independent (conditional on the empty
set) of all settings that are not its causes and all outcomes that do not share a common cause.
Note that unlike the case of Causal Completeness, here a fundamental distinction is made
between settings and outcomes. Underlying this condition there is an associated notion of ‘q-
separation’ that generalises the notion of d-separation:
Given a DAG representing a quantum network, two disjoint sets of variables X and
Y are said to be q-separated by a third disjoint set Z, denoted (X ⊥ Y |Z)q, if and only
if every undirected path between X and Y is rendered inactive by a member of Z. A
path connecting two variables is rendered inactive by Z if and only if at least one of
the following conditions is met:
(i) both variables are settings, and at least one of the settings has no directed path
to any outcome in Z;
(ii) one variable is a setting and the other is an outcome, and there is no directed
path from the setting to the outcome, or to any outcome in Z;
(iii) the path contains a collider i→ m← j where m is not an outcome in Z, and
there is no directed path from m to any outcome in Z.
The authors then proceed to show that q-separation is a sound and complete criterion for
conditional independences within their notion of quantum causal models.
Another framework is given by Henson, Lal and Pusey (HLP) [12], who keep d-separation,
but at the expense of introducing another form of agent-centric concepts: “observed” and
“unobserved” nodes. Classical data, such as outcomes of measurements, are associated to
observed nodes. Unobserved nodes output only systems, and have no outcomes associated
to them. HLP define a notion of a distribution P being generalized Markov with respect to a
graph G, with reference to this distinction. They also show that their theory reduces to the
classical theory if all nodes are observed, in which case a generalized Bayesian network is a
classical Bayesian network.
Here we note that the work of Fritz [11] provides a framework that does not make a distinction
between different types of nodes. However, no discussion is given there for a substitute for d-
separation or the Causal Markov Condition, and it is not clear therefore whether that framework
can accommodate a notion of quantum causality that is sounds and complete for the conditional
independences implied by quantum phenomena while not making agent-centric distinctions such
as the two frameworks discussed above.
For another discussion of causal concepts underlying Bell’s theorem and further motivation
for the idea that agent-centric notions are required to maintain compatibility with relativistic
causality is given in a recent paper of Wiseman and the author [7].
4. Who do we think “we” are?
“More importantly, the “no signalling...” notion rests on concepts which are
desperately vague, or vaguely applicable. The assertion that “we cannot signal faster
than light” immediately provokes the question: Who do we think we are? We who can
make measurements, we who can manipulate external fields, we who can signal at all,
even if not faster than light? Do we include chemists, or only physicists, plants, or only
animals, pocket calculators, or only mainframe computers?” - J.S. Bell , “La Nouvelle
Cuisine”, in [3].
The theories of quantum causal networks discussed in the previous section are important
developments in the elucidation of Bell’s theorem, and arguably provide at least a partial answer
to the question of what counts as a causal explanation of correlations in the quantum case, an
idea that “awaited reformulation” according to Bell, as quoted in the beginning of Sec. 2.
However, the frameworks above seem to indicate that we can recover causal principles that
conciliate quantum mechanics and relativistic causality, but at the expense of introducing agent-
centric notions of causation. For an operationalist, this doesn’t seem to be a very high price to
pay. However, I would like to suggest that there’s cause for further consideration.
As the quote above shows, Bell had two concerns regarding the usage of “no signalling” as “the
expression of fundamental causal structure of contemporary theoretical physics”. One concern,
addressed by quantum causal networks, is the reformulation of the idea of causal explanation,
generalising Reichenbach’s principle of common cause, which was implicit in Bell’s thought.
The other concern, as the passage above shows, is that the concept of “no signalling” relies on
agent-centric notions, and therefore should not form part of a fundamental physical theory, no
more than the concept of “measurement”.
Again, this may be an arcane concern for an operationalist. But remember, that if the
operationalist had never paid attention to the realist point of view, they would never have
realised that there was a whole theory of causation that needed to be modified to accommodate
quantum theory.
Now I don’t entirely agree with Bell either, mind you. Clearly we can talk about “settings”
and “outcomes” rather unambiguously, and it’s useful to do so. This of course, does not require
anthropocentrism – computers and measurements devices are good enough “agents” for defining
what we mean by those terms, without the need to involve human beings. But this might be
hinting, at least to my mind, that a complete conciliation between relativity and quantum theory
will require a deeper understanding of the role these agent-centric notions play in the theory.
And here again, I would urge the operationalist to heed the lessons learned from the realist.
Realists are not willing to accept agent-centric notions as fundamental concepts in a physical
theory. If these causal concepts are stubbornly agent-centric, for a realist that means that they
ought to be emergent properties. If that’s the case, we must understand how and why they
emerge. It’s a speculation, but I think it’s one worth considering.
Maybe one way of seeing all this is that these new developments have gone to great lengths
towards solving the mystery of Bell’s theorem, towards the conceptual renewal that Bell sought
in order to reconcile relativistic causal structure and quantum theory. However, the efforts so
far have done so only at the expense of forcing us to face up to the other major conceptual
puzzle of quantum theory: the measurement problem. Which is a great advance: perhaps we
are reducing two mysteries to one!
Going further, it would be interesting to determine whether Causal Completeness can be
maintained together with relativistic causal structure, perhaps with a modification of the concept
of independence, or relaxing some of the implicit or explicit assumptions of the formalism,
e.g. that the events considered are part of a single relativistic space-time manifold – would
a multiverse theory allow for fundamental causal explanation free of agent-centric terms? Or
perhaps it could provide a story about how those notions emerge from a more fundamental
background?
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